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Abstract
There is an interesting discovery that several neural networks
are vulnerable to adversarial examples. That is many machine
learning models misclassify the samples with only a little
change which will not be noticed by human eyes. Genera-
tive adversarial networks (GANs) are the most popular mod-
els for image generation by jointly optimizing discriminator
and generator. With stability train, some regularization and
normalization have been used to let the discriminator satisfy
Lipschitz consistency. In this paper, we have analyzed that the
generator may produce adversarial examples for discrimina-
tor during the training process, which may cause the unstable
training of GANs. For this reason, we propose a direct adver-
sarial training method for GANs. At the same time, we prove
that this direct adversarial training can limit the lipschitz con-
stant of the discriminator and accelerate the convergence of
the generator. We have verified the advanced performs of
the method on multiple baseline networks, such as DCGAN,
WGAN, WGAN-GP, WGAN-LP, and WGAN-ALP.
Introduction
Recently, Generative adversarial networks (GANs) (Good-
fellow et al. 2014) have been used in several generative
tasks, such as image impainting (Yu et al. 2018; Yeh et al.
2017), attribute editing (Tao et al. 2019; Shen et al. 2020),
adversarial examples (Xiao et al. 2018; Song et al. 2018).
From the game perspective, GANs is a two-player zero-
sum game, in which a discriminator measures the distance
between generated and real distributions, while a genera-
tor tries to fool the discriminator by minimizing the dis-
tance between real and generated distributions. Specifically,
vanilla GAN (Goodfellow et al. 2014) trains a critic to ap-
proximate the JS divergence, f-GAN(Nowozin, Cseke, and
Tomioka 2016) and WGAN (Arjovsky, Chintala, and Bottou
2017) trains a critic to approximate the f and Wasserstein
divergence respectively. According to the optimal transport
(Bonnotte 2013), Wasserstein distance is the transportation
cost of the optimal transportation map. In order to solve the
Copyright c© 2020, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
0This paper was submitted to arxiv on August 18, 2020, and
will be revised and submitted to AAAI 2021
Kantorovich duality (Kantorovich 2006) of the Wasserstein
distance, discriminator must satisfy the 1-Lipschitz consis-
tency. Lipschitz consistency is important for generalizability
and distributional consistency for GANs (Qi 2020). Qi et al.
(Qi 2020) proved that, for the discriminator with Lipschitz
consistency, the generated distributions converges to the real
distributions in GANs.
Adversarial examples (Szegedy et al. 2013) is a problem
that often occurs in neural networks. Many samples with
small perturbations had been misclassified with high proba-
bility for state-of-the-art deep neural networks. These mis-
classified samples were named as Adversarial Examples. At
present, the best defense of adversarial attacks is through ad-
versarial training. Adversarial training (Goodfellow, Shlens,
and Szegedy 2014) used adversarial examples to train the
classifier, that improved the robustness of the models.
Inspired by adversarial examples in deep neural networks,
we believe that the instability of the GANs training is due to
the adversarial examples generated by generator which fool
the discriminator. Based on the above assumptions, we first
did a confirmatory experiment. The adversarial attack with
the discriminator of DCGAN (Radford, Metz, and Chintala
2015) are shown in Fig.1. The success of the attack is de-
fined as:
|D(xˆf )−D(xr)| ≤ 0.02
|D(xˆr)−D(xf )| ≤ 0.02 (1)
Where D represents the discriminator. xf and xr represent
the fake images which generated by generator without con-
vergence and real images samples from datasets, respec-
tively. xˆf and xˆr are adversarial examples of generated im-
ages and real images, respectively. From Fig.1, we see that
the average frequency when discriminator without adver-
sarial training has been successfully attacked is about 3.5,
which is too easy. Since the model is assumed to have in-
finite capacity (Goodfellow et al. 2014), without any prior,
the generator has a high probability to generate adversar-
ial examples of the discriminator, which makes the training
of GANs unstable. In order to avoid this issue, this paper
introduces adversarial training into the training of GANs,
and proposes a method called direct adversarial training
for GANs, which accelerates the convergence, reduces the
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Wasserstein distance between real and generated distribu-
tions, and improves the quality of the generated images. The
main contributions can be summarized as follows:
• Different from the adversarial perturbation on the classi-
fier, we propose a new perturbation method based on the
distance metric in the discriminator.
• We propose to use direct adversarial training in GANs
training, which has achieved better results on multiple
popular GANs.
• We prove direct adversarial training can adaptively adjust
Lipschitz continuous of the discriminator, which is differ-
ent from the gradient penalty proposed by previous work
and accelerate the convergence of the generator.
Background and Related Work
Generative Adversarial Networks
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) is a two-player
zero-sum game, where the generator G(z) is a distribu-
tion mapping function that transforms samples of a low-
dimensional latent distribution z into samples from the target
images distribution Pg(x). The generator is trained with an-
other network D(x), which evaluates the distance between
generated distribution Pg(x) and real distribution Pr(x).
The generator and discriminator minimize and maximize the
distribution distance respectively. This minimax game can
be expressed as:
min
φ
max
θ
f(φ, θ) =Ex∼pr [g1(Dθ(x))]
+Ez∼pz [g2(Dθ(Gφ(z)))]
(2)
Where φ and θ are parameters of the generator G and dis-
criminator D, respectively. Pr and Pz represent the real
distribution and latent distribution respectively. Specifically,
vanilla GAN (Goodfellow et al. 2014) can be described by
g1(t) = g2(−t) = − log(1 + e−t), f -GAN (Nowozin,
Cseke, and Tomioka 2016) and WGAN (Arjovsky, Chintala,
and Bottou 2017) can be written as g1(t) = −e−t,
g2(t) = 1− t and g1(t) = g2(−t) = t respectively.
Lipschitz Constant and WGAN
Lipschitz constant of a function f : X → Y is defined by:
||f ||L = sup
x,y∈X;x 6=y
||f(x)− f(y)||
||x− y|| (3)
Intuitively, the function f is called K-Lipschitz continu-
ous, if there exists a constant K ≥ 0 for which ||f(x) −
f(y)|| ≤ K||x − y|| for any x, y ∈ X . Theoretically,
Lipschitz constant can be approximated by spectral norm,
the low Lipschitz constant means that the neural network is
less sensitive to input perturbation and has better generaliza-
tion (Yoshida and Miyato 2017; Oberman and Calder 2018;
Couellan 2019).
For GANs, a lot of work is used to limit the Lipschitz
constant of the discriminator. The main mothods are spec-
tral normalization (Miyato et al. 2018a) and WGAN (Ar-
jovsky, Chintala, and Bottou 2017). Spectral normalization
normalize the spectral norm of the discriminator, which lim-
its its Lipschitz constant to 1. But the Lipschitz constant in
WGAN is derived from Kantorovich duality (Kantorovich
2006), the Wasserstein distance corresponding to the opti-
mal transmission can be represented as:
W (P1, P2) = sup
||f ||L=1
Ex∼prf(x)− Ex∼pgf(x) (4)
Where f : X → R is called the Kantorovich potential,
which can be used as distriminator. In order to make the
discriminator satisfy the lipschitz continuous, WGAN (Ar-
jovsky, Chintala, and Bottou 2017) use the weight clip-
ping; WGAN-GP (Gulrajani et al. 2017) use the gradient
penalty with the interpolation of real samples and gener-
ated samples: xˆ = tx + (1 − t)y for t ∼ U [0, 1] and
x ∼ Pr, y ∼ Pg being a real and generated samples;
WGAN-ALP (Terje´k 2019) inspired by Virtual Adversarial
Training (VAT) (Miyato et al. 2018b) restrict the 1-Lipschitz
continuous at xˆ = {x, y} with the direction of adversar-
ial perturbation. Different from the above methods which
restrict the 1-Lipschitz continuous (Gulrajani et al. 2017;
Terje´k 2019; Kodali et al. 2017; Zhou et al. 2019b), WGAN-
LP (Petzka, Fischer, and Lukovnicov 2017) restrict the k-
Lipschitz continuous (k ≤ 1), which is derived from the op-
timal transport with regularization. Also, qi et al. (Qi 2020)
are motivated to have lower sample complexity by directly
minimizing the Lipschitz constant rather than constraining it
to one, which can be described as 0-GP (Zhou et al. 2019a;
Mescheder, Geiger, and Nowozin 2018; Thanh-Tung, Tran,
and Venkatesh 2019).
Adversarial Examples and Adversarial Training
Adversarial examples are a common problem in neural net-
works. Given a pre-trained model h, an adversarial example
x′ is defined by x′ = x + δ with h(x′) 6= h(x) for un-
targeted attack or h(x′) = t for targeted attack. Where x
is a clean image and δ is a imperceptible tiny perturbation.
There are many methods to generate adversarial examples,
such as Fast Gradient Sign Method(FGSM) (Goodfellow,
Shlens, and Szegedy 2014), Basic Iterative Methods(BIM)
(Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016), and Projected
Gradient Descent(PGD) (Madry et al. 2017). FGSM uses the
single gradient step to create adversarial examples:{
x′ = x+  · sign(∇xL(x, y)) for untargeted
x′ = x−  · sign(∇xL(x, t)) for targeted
(5)
Where L is the loss function. For untargeted attack, y is the
true label of the clean image, so we use the gradient ascent;
and for targeted attack, t is the label of the target image,
so we use the gradient descent. PGD is a multi-step method
which create adversarial examples by iterative:{
xk+1 = clip
(
xk + α · sign(∇xL(xk, y))
)
for untargeted
xk+1 = clip
(
xk − α · sign(∇xL(xk, t))
)
for targeted
(6)
Where clip is the clip function, x0 = x, x′ = xK and K is
the number of iterations.
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(a) adversarial attack without the adversarial training
(ξ¯fake = 3.2, ξ¯real = 3.88)
Fake 
samples
Real 
samples
Images with 
Adversarial attack
Clean images
(b) adversarial attack with the adversarial training
(ξ¯fake = 37.36, ξ¯real = 7.44)
Figure 1: Adversarial attack with the discriminator. (a) and (b) are the adversarial samples when dcgan has no adversarial
training and adversarial training on mnist, respectively. Top two lines are the fake samples which are generated by generator
without convergence. Bottom two lines are real samples from mnist dataset. ξ¯fake and ξ¯real are the average number of attacks
when fake images and real images are successfully attacked, respectively
Adversarial training is a good and sample method to avoid
adversarial examples, which improves the robustness of the
neural networks by:
min
θ
Ex,y∼D[ max||δ||p≤
Lθ(x+ δ, y)] (7)
Where x, y ∼ D is the joint distribution of data (image, la-
bel), θ is the parameter of the model. This min-max problem
is similar to the GANs, the main difference is the indepen-
dent variable of the maximization problem is image sample
x in adversarial training, not parameters of the discriminator.
For GANs, most of the work is attack the generator to
produce images we dont expect. There is no paper analyz-
ing the relationship between the Lipschitz continuous of dis-
criminator and adversarial samples. The work closest to us is
Rob-GAN(Liu and Hsieh 2019), which added the adversar-
ial training for classifier in cGANs. Different from the Rob-
GAN, we consider that the discriminator may be affected by
adversarial samples during training. Based on this, we pro-
pose a direct adversarial training for the discriminator, and
prove that this adversarial training can improve the robust-
ness of the discriminator, accelerate the convergence of the
generator, and improve the quality of the generated images.
Proposed Approach
We propose the direct adversarial training for GANs. Unlike
previous adversarial training for classifiers, direct adversar-
ial training is for discriminators, which is a distribution met-
ric function. The adversarial examples on the discriminator
is defined as Eq1, the unintentional attack for discriminator
can be seen as a targeted attack which minimize the distance
(under the discriminator) between the adversarial examples
of the generated images and the real ones (or that between
the examples of the reals images and generated ones). In this
part, we first introduce the direct adversarial training to de-
fend against unintentional discriminator attacks, and then we
analyze the relationship between direct adversarial training
and Lipschitz continuous and its ability to accelerate gener-
ator convergence.
G
D
PGD attack
PGD attack
Discrimination
Loss
Figure 2: Illustration of the training process. This is a similar
to the GANs training. The difference is that we add the one-
step PGD attack for real and generated images, We hope that
the discriminator can not only identify real or feak, but also
be robust to adversarial samples
Direct Adversarial Training
Motivated by adversarial examples lead to unstable GANs
training, we propose the direct adversarial training for GANs
in Fig.2. According to the loss function of GANs in Eq2, the
GANs loss with adversarial training can be writed as:
min
φ
max
θ
f ′(φ, θ) = λ1fo(φ, θ) + λ2fa(φ, θ) =
Ex∼pr [λ1g1(Dθ(x)) + λ2g1(Dθ(x+ δr))]+
Ez∼pz [λ1g2(Dθ(Gφ(z))) + λ2g2(Dθ(Gφ(z) + δf ))]
(8)
Where δr and δf are adversarial perturbation obtained by
target attack, we can get it by solving the following opti-
mization problem:
δ(xr) = arg min
||δ||p<
|g1(Dθ(xr + δr))− g¯1(Dθ(xf ))|
δ(xf ) = arg min
||δ||p<
|g2(Dθ(xf + δf ))− g¯2(Dθ(xr))|
(9)
Where xr and xf are real image and generated image,
respectively. g¯1(Dθ(xr)) and g¯2(Dθ(xf )) are the average
value of current discriminator output of the real images and
generated images with a batch, respectively. g1 and g2 are
function in Eq2. For above optimization problem in Eq (9).
We use the one-step PGD attack to achieve it:
δ(xr) = −∇xr
( |g1(D(xr))− g¯1(D(xf ))| )
δ(xf ) = −∇xf
( |g2(D(xf ))− g¯2(D(xr))| ) (10)
According to the above formula, we can write a complete
algorithm in Algorithm 1.
Direct Adversarial Training and Lipschitz
Continuous
In this part, we analyze the relationship between direct ad-
versarial training and gradient penalty whcih shows that our
proposed method can adjust the Lipschitz constant adap-
tively.
The instability of gan training is mainly caused by
the discriminator, and our adversarial training is only for
the discriminator, so we do not consider the generator at
present. For adversarial perturbation of real images δ(xr) =
−∇xr
( |g1(D(xr))− g¯1(D(xf ))| ), update of the discrim-
inator can be writed as:
max
θ
Ex∼pr
[
g1
(
Dθ(x+ δ(x))
)]
≈max
θ
Ex∼pr
[
g1
(
Dθ(x)
)
+∇xg1
(
Dθ(x)
) · δ(x)] (11)
Calculate the gradient of the Eq (11):
∇θ
[
g1
(
Dθ(xr)
)
+∇xrg1
(
Dθ(xr)
) · δ(xr)]
=∇θ
[
g1
(
Dθ(xr)
)− ∇xrg1(Dθ(xr))
· ∇xr |g1(Dθ(xr))− g¯1(Dθ(xf ))|
]
=∇θ
[
g1
(
Dθ(xr)
)− g′1∇xrDθ(xr)
· ∇xr |g1(Dθ(xr))− g¯1(Dθ(xf ))|
]
(12)
Because Dθ(xf ) is sampled from fake images, which are
independent of x, so when g1(Dθ(x)) − g¯1(Dθ(xf )) ≥ 0,
which is true in most cases, the Eq (12) is∇θ
[
g1
(
Dθ(x)
)−
g′1
2∇2xDθ(x)
]
. In this case, max∇θ
[
g1
(
Dθ(x)
) −
g′1
2∇2xDθ(x)
]
is equivalent to adding ”gradient penalty”
to loss, which can be seen as 0-GP mentioned in Sec-
tion 2. 0-GP can be used to limit the Lipsschitz con-
stant and stabilize the training of GANs. Also when
g1(Dθ(x)) − g¯1(Dθ(xf )) < 0, which means that
the discriminator is clearly trained incorrectly, the Eq
(12) is ∇θ
[
g1
(
Dθ(x)
)
+ g′1
2∇2xDθ(x)
]
. In this case,
max∇θ
[
g1
(
Dθ(x)
)
+ g′1
2∇2xDθ(x)
]
means that we hope
the discriminator will have a large change, so as to jump out
of the situation of wrong discrimination.
For adversarial perturbation of generated images δ(xf ) =
−∇xf
( |g2(D(xf ))− g¯2(D(xr))| ), where xf = Gθ(z).
Update of the discriminator can be writed as:
max
θ
Ex∼pf
[
g2
(
Dθ(x+ δ(x))
)]
≈max
θ
Ex∼pf
[
g2
(
Dθ(x)
)
+∇xg2
(
Dθ(x)
) · δ(x)] (13)
We can get the gradient form similar to the
real images: ∇θ
[
g2
(
Dθ(xf )
) − g′2∇xfDθ(xf ) ·
∇xf |g2(Dθ(xf ))− g¯2(Dθ(xr))|
]
From the above analysis, it can be seen that our proposed
direct adversarial training can adaptively limit the lipschitz
continuity, which is equivalent to 0-gp when the discrimina-
tor performance is better, and relax the limit on the lipschitz
constant when the discriminator performance is poor.
Figure 3: The results of the DCGAN with different parame-
ters in Cifar10. Where lr is learning rate, b1 is the parameter
of the adam optimizer, and It is the ratio of the update times
of the discriminator to the generator. Step is the update times
of the discriminator and IS is Inception Score which repre-
sents the quality of the generated images.
Algorithm 1 Direct Adversarial Training
Input: The batch size m, the real image distribution Pr(x), the random noize z ∼ N(0, 1), the maximum number of training
steps K, the number of steps to apply to the discriminator N, the loss function d1 and g2, the parameter λ1 and λ2.
Output: a fine-tuned generator G and discriminator D
1: for k=1, 2, · · · , K do
2: for n=1,2, · · · , N do
3: Draw m real samples xr = {x(1)r , x(2)r , · · · , x(m)r } from the real data discribution pr(x).
4: Draw m latent noise z = {z(1), z(2), · · · , z(m)}.
5: xf = {x(1)f , x(2)f , · · · , x(m)f } = Gφ
({z(1), z(2), · · · , z(m)})
6: {δ(1)f , δ(2)f , · · · , δ(m)f } = −∇x(i)f
( ∣∣∣g1(D(x(i)f ))− g1(D¯(xr))∣∣∣ )
7: {δ(1)r , δ(2)r , · · · , δ(m)r } = −∇x(i)r
( ∣∣∣g2(D(x(i)r ))− g2(D¯(xf ))∣∣∣ )
8: x(1)f−adv, x
(2)
f−adv, · · · , x(m)f−adv =
({x(1)f + δ(1)f , x(2)f + δ(2)f , · · · , x(m)f + δ(m)f })
9: x(1)r−adv, x
(2)
r−adv, · · · , x(m)r−adv =
({x(1)r + δ(1)r , x(2)r + δ(2)r , · · · , x(m)r + δ(m)r })
10: Update the discriminator by ascending its stochastic gradient:
∇θ
{
λ1
m
m∑
i=1
[
g1(Dθ(x
(i)
r )) + g2(Dθ(x
(i)
f )
]
+
λ2
m
m∑
i=1
[
g1(Dθ(x
(i)
r−adv)) + g2(Dθ(x
(i)
f−adv)
]}
end for
11: Draw m latent noise {z(1), z(2), · · · , z(m)}.
12: Update the generator by descending its stochastic gradient:
∇φ−1
m
m∑
i=1
[
g1(Dθ(x
(i)
r )) + g2(Dθ(Gφ(z
(i))))
]
end for
13: return
Accelerate generator convergence by Direct
Adversarial Training
We reconsider the direct adversarial training on the gener-
ated images from the perspective of generator convergence.
We assume that there is a constant C that satisfies:
‖Dθ(Gφ(z) + δ)−Dθ(Gφ(z))‖ ≤ C (14)
Where δ is the adversarial perturbation, which represents the
maximum perturbation direction for the discriminator, so for
any other perturbation δ0:
C ≥ ‖Dθ(Gφ(z) + δ)−Dθ(Gφ(z))‖
≥ ‖Dθ(Gφ(z) + δ0)−Dθ(Gφ(z))‖ (15)
Of course, if we consider the generator to be updated twice
before and after as a small perturbation, there are:
C ≥ ‖Dθ(Gφ(z;wt+1))−Dθ(Gφ(z;wt))‖
≥ ‖D′θ(Gφ(z;wt))‖ · ‖Gφ(z;wt+1)− (Gφ(z;wt))‖
≥ ‖D′θ(Gφ(z;wt))‖ · ‖
∂
∂w
Gφ(z;w
t)‖ · ‖wt+1 − wt‖
(16)
So the update of the generator weight ‖wt+1 − wt‖ ∝
C
‖D′θ(Gφ(z;wt))‖·‖ ∂∂wGφ(z;wt)‖
. If there is no gradient penalty,
meaning ‖D′θ(Gφ(z;wt))‖ is high, than the update of the
generator is slow, which shows the direct adversarial train-
ing can acclerate the convergence of the generator.
Experiments
This section, we will introduce the impact of the di-
rect adversarial training on DCGAN, WGAN, WGAN-GP
and WGAN-LP. The results show the effectiveness of our
method.
Experiments on DCGAN
This part, we used DCGAN to do a comparative experiment
on cifar10, the results are shown in Fig 3. From the results,
under different parameters, the methods of direct adversarial
training we proposed can improve the quality of the gener-
ated images.
Experiments on WGAN
This part, we used WGAN to do a comparative experiment
on cifar10, the results are shown in Fig 4. From the results,
The methods we propose can achieve better performance.
For Wasserstein distance, WGAN has obvious mutations in
the training process. This mutation can be considered as the
result of adversarial examples. When using the adversarial
training, the Wasserstein distance is smaller and more stable.
Figure 4: The results of the WGAN with different parame-
ters in cifar10. Where ’It’ is the ratio of the update times of
the discriminator to the generator. Step is the update times
of the generator and IS is Inception Score which represents
the quality of the generated images. Wasserstein distance is
the distance between the true distribution and the generated
distribution.
Experiments on WGAN-GP
This part, we used WGAN-GP to do a comparative exper-
iment on cifar10, the results are shown in Fig 5. Because
adversarial training can accelerate convergence, if ’It=5’, the
discriminator will be trained too well, it is not good for train-
ing of GANs, the result with adversarial training is worse
than the previous method. From the Wasserstein distance,
we can also get the same result. Compared with the original
method, adding the adversarial training causes the Wasser-
stein distance to drop rapidly when ’It=5’, which makes the
worse results. And when ’It=1’, although the improvement
is not obvious from the Inception Score, the Wasserstein dis-
tance is smaller and more stable which is different from the
result while ’It=5’. Also, we visualize the generated results
in Fig 6. From the result, we can clearly observe that the
direct adversarial training can improve the quality of gener-
ation.
Experiments on WGAN-LP
This part, we used WGAN-LP to do a comparative experi-
ment on cifar10, the results are shown in Fig 7 and Fig 8.
The result is similar to the result of WGAN-GP.
Conclusions
Motivited by adversarial examples may affact the stable
training of the GANs, in this paper, we use the adversarial
training for GANs. Since the discriminator is a distributed
metric function, based on this, we propose a new adversarial
perturbation for the discriminator. Of course, we also proved
that this kind of adversarial training can adaptively adjust the
Lipschitz continuous. Compared with the gradient penalty,
Figure 5: The results of the WGAN-GP with different pa-
rameters in Cifar10.Where ’It’ is the ratio of the update
times of the discriminator to the generator. Step is the up-
date times of the generator and IS is Inception Score which
represents the quality of the generated images. Wasserstein
distance is the distance between the true distribution and the
generated distribution.
adversarial training has achieved better results in the multi
popular GANs.
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